Raman: Ethnographic study of Indian land record digitization project

Bhuvaneswari Raman of the French Institute of Pondicherry has published The Rhetoric and Reality of Transparency: Transparent Information, Opaque City Spaces and the Empowerment Question, Journal of Community Informatics, 8(2), article 866 (2012).

The paper reports results of, among other things, an ethnographic study of an Indian project to digitize land title records.

Here is the abstract:

This paper examines the purported links between transparency, citizens’ participation and empowerment through a focus on the governance of spatial information in Indian cities. It suggests that the data transparency paradigm need to be critically examined as the effects of data visibility and mobility differ according to the nature of information disclosed and conflicts surrounding it. Both information and technology that supports it visibility are embedded in power relations. Three themes are elaborated in the paper namely, the continued difficulty with retrieving information on land and territory; the complexities involved in capturing and representing accurately the dynamics of territory use and ownership claims; and the emerging governmentality relating to spatial governance that renders power opaque.

Abstracts: Bayesian Analysis in Law: Papers presented at Conference: The Many Faces of Contemporary Philosophy and Theory of Law

Abstracts have been posted of papers presented at the Conference: The Many Faces of Contemporary Philosophy and Theory of Law, held 23-24 March 2013, at Jagellonian University, Cracow, Poland. The conference included a special working group on Bayesian analysis in law, abstracts of papers of which begin on page 6 of the abstracts volume and are excerpted below:

Dr Jeroen Keppens: Bayesian Perspectives on the Value of Evidence. Abstract:

Given the interdisciplinary audience, I would like to introduce the Bayesian approach to evidential reasoning in Law. Then I plan to move on the Bayesian modeling techniques and the various concerns and difficulties that arise from it.

Paweł Banaś and Krzysztof Kasparek: Some remarks about controversies concerning applying Bayes theorem to criminal policy-making. Abstract:

The following paper aims at summarizing a discussion concerning the exploitation of Baysesian analysis within criminal policy-making, namely problems with the so called postprison civil commitment of sex offenders as sexually violent predators (SVPs) employed currently in some of the US states. During this process it is determined whether a former convict will be “classified” as SVP. Typically, actuarial instruments are used in order to help decide on this issue. Recently, Richard Wollert has pointed out that exploitation of Bayesian theorem may prove useful in this type of cases when addressing at least some of the questions that may arise. However, his ideas were met with much criticism within risk-assessment community. In this paper we want to present main arguments of both sides of the debate and point to some of the possible problems with Bayesian analysis as used in forensic psychology.

Piotr Bystranowski: Czy da się nauczyć prawników statystyki? Sieci bayesowskie a unikanie błędów probabilistycznych w rozumowaniach prawniczych. Abstract:

Od lat siedemdziesiątych i czasów przełomowych eksperymentów Kahnemana i Tversky’ego powszechnym stało się przekonanie, iż ludzkie osądy w warunkach niepewności często dają rezultaty systematycznie i rażąco niezgodne z regułami matematycznego rachunku prawdopodobieństwa, w tym zwłaszcza z tzw. wzorem Bayesa. Od błędów tego rodzaju nie jest wolna sala sądowa. Przeciwnie – wyniki szeregu procesów karnych pokazują, że wymiar sprawiedliwości jest podatny na wiele błędów w rozumowaniach probabilistycznych (z tzw. złudzeniem prokuratora na czele). Ich skutkiem bywa, na przykład, przypisanie zbyt dużej pewności materiałowi dowodowemu, który z formalnego punktu widzenia zdaje się być dalece nierozstrzygający. Pociąga to za sobą pytanie, w jaki sposób rozwiązać ową ewidentną niezgodność mię-dzy intuicyjnymi rozumowaniami w warunkach niepewności a formalnymi metodami probabilistycznymi. [...] Tych mankamentów zdaje się unikać proponowana przez Normana Fentona i Martina Neila wizualizacja przy pomocy sieci bayesowskich. W ten sposób można modelować nawet najbardziej skomplikowany materiał dowodowy w sposób przejrzysty dla laika. Rola stron procesu ograniczałaby się tu do sprecyzowania prawdopodobieństw a priori i zależności między poszczególnymi zmiennymi, zaś zadanie skonstruowania architektury sieci pozostawiano by ekspertom. O prawomocności obliczeń dokonywanych „pod spodem” można by przekonać strony na prostych przykładach, z wykorzystaniem np. drzewek zdarzeniowych. Zatem zastosowanie sieci bayesowskich w procesie miałoby być, zdaniem Fentona i Neila, najprostszym sposobem uniknięcia błędów probabilistycznych bez konieczności podejmowania beznadziejnego zadania, jakim jest nauczenie prawników statystyki.

Bartosz Janik: Some remarks concerning Bayesian rationality in Law. Abstract:

This paper aims at providing some remarks concerning Bayesian decision theory (BDT) and rationality in the legal perspective. As a first point I would like to provide a philosophical account of rationality and I will try to, while focusing on most appropriate meaning of it, to judge it from a legal point of view. It will be clear that the general notion of legal rationality is very complicated and we must set some particular goals to achieve a more global perspective. In my paper, I will focus on legal reasoning and will try to adopt Rescher’s distinction of cognitive/practical/evaluative rationality for the purpose of this analysis. The main point of this part will be the evaluation, to what extent risk aversion is connected with rationality. The thesis will be formulated in the following manner: the mechanisms of risk avoidance could serve as local rationality–triggers (as to oppose skepticism in Rescher’s terminology and deal with imperfection of our cognitive resources). The second point will be the attempt to show the connection between Bayesian decision theory (which focuses on error minimizing and thus, risk avoidance) and rationality. I will introduce basic formalism of BDT and show how, on that basis, we could formulate the local rationality for legal decision making. Again, the central notion will be the risk and I will present formal mechanism of risk avoidance in BDT. The notion of rationality, as a risk optimizer, will be proposed for this local environment. The last point of the analysis will be the answer to the question to what extent we are free from legal–theoretic assumptions in formulations of rationality. It turns out that the choice of an underlying theory of law will always determine our global notion of rationality but in the local perspective we could formulate general tools and concepts.

Izabela Skoczeń: Why should a lawyer calculate the probability of implicature formation? Abstract:

This paper aims at providing examples of possible applications of methods for calculating the probability of implicature formation (with the use of the bayesian method) in legal situations. The basis for the present considerations will be the notion of scalar implicatures, based on the gricean approach to Pragmatics. Scalars are based on conventional meanings attributed to words with the use of lexical scales (Horn). Placing a word in a definite position in a scale enables the speakers to attribute it a definite meaning, that does not have to be consistent with the lexical meaning that would be understood with the use of classical logic. [...] As experiments have proven, in contexts with data deficit the probability of definite implicature formation is rather not intuitive. A quite striking example is the following situation: if while describing three objects, the speakers has information concerning the features of only two of them, the hearer seems more prone to infer, that the third item disposes of the same feature while hearing an utterance with the numeral “two”, rather than “some”. This surprising result seems most vital for lawyers, as it conveys a hidden pattern of linguistic manipulation. The conventional implicature that should be cancelled due to pragmatic reasons is so strong, that it still influences the meaning. Imagine, that we have three suspects A,B,C and we know that A and B were at the crime scene that day. We don’t know, whether C was at the crime scene. If the probability of omitting scalar implicature cancellation is higher when using expressions like some, rather than numerals, C’s defendant should rather say “Some of the suspects were at the crime scene.” rather than “Two were at the crime scene.”. The later formulation, according to Goodman and Stuhlm¨uller calculations, would boost the probability of the court inferring the implicature that C was also at the crime scene that day. This observation opens an entire new range of possibilities of manipulating implicature formation in contexts, where the hearer is aware of the speaker’s data being insufficient. It is often the in judicial environments, when the provided evidence is too scarce.

For full text of the papers, please contact the authors.

HT Bartosz Janik

Mendelson: Private Control Over Access to Public Law: Federal Regulatory Use of Private Standards

Professor Nina A. Mendelson of University of Michigan Law School has posted Private Control Over Access to Public Law: The Puzzling Federal Regulatory Use of Private Standards, forthcoming in Michigan Law Review.

Here is the abstract:

To save resources and build on private expertise, federal agencies have incorporated private standards into thousands of federal regulations – but only by “reference.” An individual who wishes to read this binding federal regulatory law cannot access it for free online or in a government depository library, as she can the U.S. Code or Code of Federal Regulations. Instead, the individual is referred to the private organization that prepared the standard, which typically asserts a copyright and charges a significant access fee. Or else she must travel to Washington, D.C. Thus, this category of law has come under largely private control.

In assessing the arguments why law needs to be public, previous analyses have focused almost wholly on whether regulated entities have notice of their obligations. This article evaluates several other considerations, including notice to those who expect to benefit from the way government regulates others, such as consumers of dangerous products, neighbors of natural gas pipelines, and Medicare beneficiaries. Ready public access also is critical to ensure that federal agencies are accountable to the courts, Congress, and the electorate for the regulatory power they exercise. As shown by an assessment of the institutional dynamics surrounding public and private interaction to define the scope of federal regulation, the need for ready public access is at least as strong in this collaborative governance setting as when agencies act alone. Finally, expressive harm is likely to flow from government adopting regulatory law that is, in contrast to American law in general, more costly to access and harder to find. Full consideration of the importance of public access both strengthens the case for reform and limits the range of acceptable reform measures.

Washington: Legislative Transparency and the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress

Professor Anne L. Washington of George Mason University has posted an abstract entitled Legislative Transparency and the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress.

Here is the abstract:

What has motivated Congress to build the technical and organizational infrastructure that is necessary for legislative transparency? Congress unlike the executive branch has not faced the institutional pressure to modernize its work practices through technology. The legislative branch has been free to determine at what times and under what circumstances to change internal practices, precedent and technology. The infrequently formed Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress has ushered in sweeping simultaneous change in both chambers. The JCOC was formed in 1946, 1965 and 1993. An examination of the common traits from each reform effort provides some direction as to why Congress embraces technology. This talk covers the history of the reports, laws and funding that have provided access to Congressional information.

Lagnado, Fenton, and Neil: Legal idioms: A framework for evidential reasoning

Dr. David A. Lagnado of University College London, and Professor Dr. Norman Fenton and Professor Dr. Martin Neil, both of Queen Mary University of London, have published Legal idioms: A framework for evidential reasoning, Argument & Computation 4(1), 46-63 (2013).

Here is the abstract:

How do people make legal judgments based on complex bodies of interrelated evidence? This paper outlines a novel framework for evidential reasoning using causal idioms. These idioms are based on the qualitative graphical component of Bayesian networks, and are tailored to the legal context. They can be combined and reused to model complex bodies of legal evidence. This approach is applied to witness and alibi testimony, and is illustrated with a real legal case. We show how the framework captures critical aspects of witness reliability, and the potential interrelations between witness reliabilities and other hypotheses and evidence. We report a brief empirical study on the interpretation of alibi evidence, and show that people’s intuitive inferences fit well with the qualitative aspects of the idiom-based framework.

Palermo: Logique, Probabilité et Rhétorique dans l’Argumentation Juridique

Angela Palermo of l’Université de Franche-Comté has published Logique, Probabilité et Rhétorique dans l’Argumentation Juridique, Revue de Synthèse, 133(3), pp. 319-344 (2012).

Here is the abstract:

Judicial reasoning has often been seen as mere rhetoric. Yet, as I argue here, this reasoning actually stems from the exigencies of truth. This in turn requires questioning the relationship between logic and rhetoric in the legal field. The logic referred to is probability, which is most appropriate to pragmatic rationality. Hence, to shed light on judicial reasoning, this essay puts the relationship between judicial logic and probabilistic logic in historical perspective whilst taking into account the existing literature on the topic.

HT @aldofont

Nyman-Metcalf and Täks : Simplifying the law: Can ICT help us?

Professor Katrin Nyman-Metcalf and Ermo Täks, both of Tallinn University of Technology, have published Simplifying the law—can ICT help us? forthcoming in International Journal of Law and Information Technology.

Here is the abstract:

The article analyses how Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) can assist in simplifying law, by visualizing it and structuring it. It describes current research as well as activities by the European Union to make law more accessible by using ICT. The authors offers a new method for visualization of law for its better systematization and use, based on the legal language and its components.

Articles on legal information or decision making in new issue of Journal of Empirical Legal Studies

The new issue of Journal of Empirical Legal Studies (10(2), June 2013) includes several articles on legal information or decision making:

• Doug Williams: Do Racial Preferences Affect Minority Learning in Law Schools?
• Andreas Glöckner and Christoph Engel: Can We Trust Intuitive Jurors? Standards of Proof and the Probative Value of Evidence in Coherence-Based Reasoning
• Christina L. Boyd, David A. Hoffman, Zoran Obradovic and Kosta Ristovski: Building a Taxonomy of Litigation: Clusters of Causes of Action in Federal Complaints
• Ryan C. Black and James F. Spriggs II: The Citation and Depreciation of U.S. Supreme Court Precedent
• William C. Thompson, Suzanne O. Kaasa and Tiamoyo Peterson: Do Jurors Give Appropriate Weight to Forensic Identification Evidence?

HT @aabibliographer

CODR 2013: Conference on Online Dispute Resolution: Tweets and Resources

This post links to resources related to CODR 2013: Conference on Online Dispute Resolution, held 19 April 2013 at Stanford Law School.

Click here for Twitter tweets from the conference, archived in .csv format.

The Twitter hashtag for the conference was #CODR2013

Some papers from the conference are available at http://blogs.law.stanford.edu/codr2013/papers/

Here is the conference agenda (from here):

Panel 1: The Impact of ODR on the Practice of Law

Ron Dolin, Lecturer in Law, Stanford Law School: “Impact of ODR on Small Claims”

Richard S. Granat, Director, Center for Law Practice Technology and CEO/Founder, LawMediaLabs, Inc.: “Software-Assisted Online Divorce Mediation”

Ayelet Sela, JSD Candidate, Stanford Law School: “ODR System Design: Lessons from Research and Practice”

Panel 2: The Technology of ODR

James Ring, CEO, Fair Outcomes, Inc.: “Using Online Commitment Mechanisms to Manage and Resolve Legal Claims“

Loic Coutelier, Director of Arbitration and Product Manager, Modria.com: “Three Practical Applications of ODR Innovations”

Jin Ho Verdonschot, Justice Sector Advisor, The Netherlands: “The Future of Courts: A New Procedure for Neighbor Disputes in the Netherlands”

Moderator: Roland Vogl, Lecturer in Law and Executive Director, Stanford Program in Law, Science and Technology

Panel 3: ODR in the International Arena

Colin Rule, CEO, Modria.com: “Online Dispute Resolution and Internet Justice“

Vikki M. Rogers, Director, Institute of International Commercial Law, Pace Law School: “Managing Disputes in the Online Global Marketplace: Reviewing the Progress of UNCITRAL’s Working Group III on ODR“

Amy J. Schmitz, Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law: “ODR to Address American Exceptionalism in Arbitration“

Moderator: Janet Martinez, Senior Lecturer in Law and Director, Gould Negotiation & Mediation Program, Stanford Law School

For videos of this conference, please see the comments to this post.

Sprain and Gastil: An Interpretative Account of Jurors’ Expressed Deliberative Rules and Premises

Professor Dr. Leah Sprain of Colorado State University and Professor Dr. John Gastil of Penn State University have published What Does It Mean to Deliberate? An Interpretative Account of Jurors’ Expressed Deliberative Rules and Premises, Communication Quarterly, 61(2), 151-171 (2013).

Here is the abstract:

To advance deliberative theory and practice, this study considers the experiences of trial jurors who engaged in deliberation. Conceptualized as a speech event, this article inductively explores the deliberative rules and premises articulated by jurors. Jurors believe deliberation should be rigorous and democratic, including speaking opportunities for all, open-minded consideration of different views, and respectful listening. Jurors actively consider information, but face-to-face deliberation is essential for thoroughly processing evidence. Although emotions should not influence the final verdict, participants report that emotions often reinforce deliberative norms. These results inform theory and deliberative experiences in and beyond the jury.