Calls for Papers: Workshops @ ICAIL 2011

Calls for papers, with diverse submission deadlines, have been issued for the workshops at ICAIL 2011: The International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law; the workshops are scheduled to be held 6 and 10 June 2011, in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA.

DESI IV: Workshop on Setting Standards for Searching Electronically Stored Information in Discovery Proceedings, 6 June 2011. Deadlines:

• 1 April 2011: Research papers;
• 22 April 2011: Position papers.

Workshop on Agent Model-Based Reasoning in Law, 6 June 2011. Deadline:

• 14 March 2011.

Computational Law: A Bridge Towards the Business Rules, 6 June 2011. Deadline:

• 20 April 2011.

AI & Evidential Inference, 10 June 2011. Deadline:

• TBA

AHLTL 2011: Applying Human Language Technology to the Law, 10 June 2011. Deadline:

• 31 March 2011.

Coherence 2011: Artificial Intelligence, Coherence, and Judicial Reasoning, 10 June 2011. Deadlines:

• 15 April 2011: Abstracts;
• 3 June 2011: Full papers.

HT JURIX.

Call for Papers: AP-LS 2011: American Psychology – Law Society Annual Meeting

A call for papers — with submission deadline of 15 September 2010 — has been issued for AP-LS 2011: The 2011 American Psychology – Law Society Annual Meeting, to be held 2-6 March 2011, in Miami, Florida, USA.

The meeting will be held in conjunction with the 4th International Congress of Psychology and Law.

Proposals for AP-LS 2011 are invited respecting “symposia, papers, and posters addressing topics in all areas of psychology and law. We especially welcome proposals that are empirically based and those that involve new and emerging topics within psychology and law.”

For more information, please see the call for papers.

Brest & Krieger: Problem Solving, Decision Making & Professional Judgment: A Guide for Lawyers & Policymakers

Because legal decisionmaking is a key context for legal information and communication systems, the following forthcoming textbook may be of interest to the legal informatics and legal communication community:

Dean Paul Brest of Stanford University Law School and Professor Linda Hamilton Krieger of the University of Hawaii William S. Richardson School of Law will publish a textbook entitled Problem Solving, Decision Making, and Professional Judgment: A Guide for Lawyers and Policymakers, with Oxford University Press in March 2010. Here is the description:

“Problem Solving, Decision Making, and Professional Judgment: A Guide for Lawyers and Policymakers will prepare students and professionals for their roles as creative problem solvers. Paul Brest and Linda Hamilton Krieger discuss essential qualities of practical wisdom that are important across disciplines and essential to one’s everyday life as a decisionmaker, consumer, and citizen. This book can stand alone as a text or work as a supplement to a core law or public policy curriculum.

“Professor Brest and Professor Krieger aim to prepare students to exercise problem solving and decision making skills in the complex social environments in which they will work. They include bodies of knowledge drawn from statistics, decision science, social and cognitive psychology, and ‘judgment and decision making’ (JDM) psychological literature. They combine quantitative approaches to empirical analysis and decisionmaking (statistics and decision science) with the psychological literature that demonstrates the systematic errors of the intuitive and social empiricist or decisionmaker. Their ultimate goal is to help readers ‘get it right’ in their roles as professionals, citizens, and individuals.”

HT @donnaseyle.

Emotion and the Law: Psychological Perspectives: Proceedings of the 2008 Nebraska Symposium on Motivation

Emotion and the Law: Psychological Perspectives (2009), the proceedings of the 2008 Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, and edited by Professor Brian H. Bornstein and Professor Richard L. Wiener, both of the University of Nebraska-Lincoln Department of Psychology , has been published by Springer.

Here are the contents:

Brian H. Bornstein & Richard L. Wiener, Emotion and the Law: A Field Whose Time Has Come.

• Abstract: “Psychological research on emotion has a rich and varied history. A number of protopsychologists (e.g., Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Hume) wrote about the effect of the passions on human thought and behavior, and empirical work on emotion dates back over 100 years (e.g., James 1890/1950). Emotion research has long been a central component of social, personality, and clinical psychology, and it is increasingly being integrated into other psychological subdisciplines, such as cognitive and physiological psychology. In fact, the contributions of neuroscience to understanding the role of emotion in thought and decision making has recently “taken off,” as cataloged in recent reviews of this burgeoning field of research (e.g., Winkielman and Cacioppo 2006). In contrast to the neuroscientific approach, the work collected in the present volume focuses on the role of emotion in molar judgments and behavior (Forgas et al. 2006), the conduct that is characteristic of the many actors in the legal system. As such, this work focuses on social cognitive models of behavior and judgment in the real-world context of law and policy making.”

Joseph P. Forgas, Affect in Legal and Forensic Settings: The Cognitive Benefits of Not Being Too Happy.

• Abstract: “Imagine the following scenario. It is a cold, rainy day, and as you enter the local news agency to buy a paper, you briefly notice a number of strange items on the checkout counter – a matchbox car, some plastic toy animals, and a few other trinkets, objects that really do not belong in a shop environment. As you leave the store, a young woman approaches you, introduces herself as a psychologist conducting research on memory, and asks you to try to remember as many of the strange objects you have briefly seen in the shop as you can. The question she is interested in is this: Can your slightly negative mood induced by the unpleasant weather improve the accuracy of your eyewitness memory for the objects you saw? More generally, are we better at remembering everyday details when we are in a bad mood, or do people remember more on a bright, sunny day, when they are in a good mood?”

Neal Feigenson, Emotional Influences on Judgments of Legal Blame: How They Happen, Whether They Should, and What to Do About It.

• Abstract: “Determining how people’s emotions affect their judgments of legal responsibility and blame, and when, if ever, they should, is a challenging and important task. Widely accepted dual process theories of cognition (e.g., Chaiken and Trope 1999) posit that human judgment is the product of two, largely concurrent cognitive systems: an intuitive system which operates automatically, effortlessly, and often affectively (i.e., emotion-infused), and a reflective system which is more controlled, effortful, and normatively rational (Kahneman and Frederick 2002, label these as ‘System 1′ and ‘System 2,’ respectively). Legal judgments should be no exception. They involve explicit, more or less rational processing, but they also reflect intuition, both non-emotional (see, generally, the ‘heuristics and biases’ literature; e.g., Gigerenzer and Engel 2006) and emotional.”

Norbert L. Kerr, Explorations in Juror Emotion and Juror Judgment.

• Abstract: “The fictional sleuth, Sherlock Holmes, was acutely sensitive to the importance – even the primacy – of empirical evidence for developing workable theories. It is an insight which modern behavioral scientists might be well advised to recognize. Elsewhere (Kerr 1998), I reported some survey data that indicated that modern editors, reviewers and readers expect nearly any sound piece of behavioral science to begin with an explicit hypothesis, derived from a priori theory. I went on to suggest that this strong preference was based on both a healthy and unhealthy premise. The healthy premise is that cogent a priori theory can do much to justify, organize, and empower our observations – an axiom of the classic hypothetico-deductive model of science (e.g., Hempel 1966). The unhealthy premise is that this is always or invariably the case – that ‘…it is a capital mistake not to theorize, regardless of the knowledge, understanding, or even existence of the facts’ (Kerr 1998, p. 201). This tempts us to attempt to make theoretical bricks, even when we lack empirical clay.”

Joel D. Lieberman, Inner Terror and Outward Hate: The Effects of Mortality Salience on Bias Motivated Attacks.

• Abstract: “In 2008, a year that an African American man was elected President of the United States, and same sex unions were temporarily legalized in California and recognized in New York, reminders of intolerance and prejudice remained strong. Immediately following the election of Barack Obama, there was a surge in bias motivated attacks across the country, with derogating and intimidating remarks delivered by adults and even children as young as second-graders (Associated Press 2008). Further, shortly after the same sex unions were legalized in California, a majority of California voters supported ‘Proposition 8,’ restricting the definition of marriage to that of a union between a man and a woman. In addition, during the previous year, nooses were displayed in various locations throughout the country such as on school grounds in Jena, Louisiana and on college campuses including the University of Maryland and Columbia University (Associated Press 2007). In addition, on February 12, 2008, in Oxnard California, an eighth-grader, 15-year old Lawrence King, was shot in the head and killed by a fellow student, 14-year old, Brandon McInerney. Apparently King, who often dressed in a feminine manner, had asked McInerney to be his valentine the day earlier (Newsweek 2008). These types of bias motivated attacks as well as others that have previously captured the nation’s attention reveal the darker side of humanity. Although basic cognitive processes that cause individuals to classify others as either ingroup or outgroup members are likely relevant in such attacks, basic categorization on its own may not be sufficient to unleash the anger that is sometimes apparent in hate crimes, such as that of the King murder. As a result, these crimes require additional psychological explanations to help us more clearly understand the underlying motivations that produce such behaviors. This chapter will explore a variety of social psychological theories that have been used to explain prejudicial attitudes and behavior that foster bias motivated crimes, with a particular focus on Terror Management Theory.”

Cara Laney & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Truth in Emotional Memories.

• Abstract: “So said Jackson Browne in his 1974 track ‘Fountain of Sorrow.’ The album containing this track stayed for 29 weeks on the Billboard Top Pop Album Chart. While we know rather little about changing the future, we do know quite a bit about how to change the past. Since witnesses in legal proceedings are routinely asked to recall the past, it is crucial to understand how accurate these recollections are, how prone to distortion they might be. Moreover, witnesses in legal proceedings are often asked to recall a past event that was quite emotional in nature. Thus it is crucial to also understand the nature of emotional memories. Fortunately, we have made considerable progress in this endeavor, and some of that progress is described in this chapter.”

Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Moody View of The Law: Looking Back and Looking Ahead at Law and the Emotions.

• Abstract: “The current Symposium celebrates 3,400 years of law and emotion. How so? In Leviticus, Chapter 19 Verse 15, judges are instructed to judge rich and poor alike – interestingly, they are, separately, told not to favor the poor and not to favor the rich, but rather to do justice equally. Some interpreters read the prohibition on favoring the poor as trying to ensure that even positive emotions such as sympathy do not bias legal decision-making. Indeed, as this Chapter goes to press, the confirmation hearings for Judge Sonia Sotomayor are highlighting just such issues. Alternatively, we might say that we celebrate more than four centuries of law and emotion: In the late sixteenth century the common law began to recognize the offense of manslaughter, where a killing occurred in the course of a brawl or ‘chance [or chaunce] medley,’ reflecting the passion or emotional state of those engaged in fighting (e.g., Brown 1963; Dressler 1982). We might also say that the psychological study of law and emotion is about 100 years old, harking back to the foundational legal psychological work of Hugo Munsterberg (1908) and his study of the biasing impact of emotion on memory and judgment, and of the clues that emotional reactions could give to a defendant’s guilt or innocence.”

Kassin et al. on Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations

Professor Saul M. Kassin of John Jay College of Criminal Justice, and colleagues, have published Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations, forthcoming in Law and Human Behavior. Here is the abstract:

“Recent DNA exonerations have shed light on the problem that people sometimes confess to crimes they did not commit. Drawing on police practices, laws concerning the admissibility of confession evidence, core principles of psychology, and forensic studies involving multiple methodologies, this White Paper summarizes what is known about police-induced confessions. In this review, we identify suspect characteristics (e.g., adolescence; intellectual disability; mental illness; and certain personality traits), interrogation tactics (e.g., excessive interrogation time; presentations of false evidence; and minimization), and the phenomenology of innocence (e.g., the tendency to waive Miranda rights) that influence confessions as well as their effects on judges and juries. This article concludes with a strong recommendation for the mandatory electronic recording of interrogations and considers other possibilities for the reform of interrogation practices and the protection of vulnerable suspect populations.”

Background on this article is provided by Ian Herbert in The Psychology and Power of False Confessions, APS Observer, December 2009.

HT The Situationist.

Lynch & Haney on Capital Jury Deliberation: Effects on Death Sentencing, Comprehension, and Discrimination

Professor Mona Lynch of the University of California, Irvine School of Social Ecology, and Professor Craig Haney of the University of California, Santa Cruz Department of Psychology, have published Capital Jury Deliberation: Effects on Death Sentencing, Comprehension, and Discrimination, 33 Law and Human Behavior 481 (2009). Here is the abstract:

“This study focused on whether and how deliberations affected the comprehension of capital penalty phase jury instructions and patterns of racially discriminatory death sentencing. Jury-eligible subjects were randomly assigned to view one of four versions of a simulated capital penalty trial in which the race of defendant (Black or White) and the race of victim (Black or White) were varied orthogonally. The participants provided their initial ‘straw’ sentencing verdicts individually and then deliberated in simulated 4–7 person ‘juries.’ Results indicated that deliberation created a punitive rather than lenient shift in the jurors’ death sentencing behavior, failed to improve characteristically poor instructional comprehension, did not reduce the tendency for jurors to misuse penalty phase evidence (especially, mitigation), and exacerbated the tendency among White mock jurors to sentence Black defendants to death more often than White defendants.”

Arnaudo, Cognitive Law: An Introduction

Luca Arnaudo of the Italian Competition Authority and LUISS Guido Carli, has posted Cognitive Law: An Introduction on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

“Over the past decades cognitive neuroscience has achieved major results in better understanding the neural basis of human behavior. Economics has been the first social science interested and able in using some of these results for its own purposes, mainly because of the renewed interest towards psychology fostered by behavioral economics researches. Even with some delay, also law studies are now showing a growing interest towards these researches. The essay first reviews the major facts of this process, then supports new applications of cognitive neuroscience researches to law, together with the proposal of a new definition for such field of researches. Finally, the essay focuses on possible improvements of legal drafting and of the application of legislative and statutory provisions in the light of a better knowledge of reactions to said provisions under a cognitive-behavioral profile, also by means of practical experiments.”

HT Law & Neuroscience Blog.

Redlich et al. on Self-Reported False Confessions and False Guilty Pleas among Offenders with Mental Illness

Professor Allison D. Redlich of the SUNY Albany School of Criminal Justice, and colleagues, have published Self-Reported False Confessions and False Guilty Pleas among Offenders with Mental Illness, forthcoming in Law and Human Behavior. Here is the abstract:

“Persons with mental illness may be at risk for false admissions to police and to prosecutors because of the defining characteristics of mental illness, but potentially because of heightened recidivism rates and increased opportunities. We surveyed 1,249 offenders with mental disorders from six sites about false confessions (FCs) and false guilty pleas (FGPs). Self-reports of FC ranged from 9 to 28%, and FGPs ranged from 27 to 41% depending upon site. False admissions to murder and rape were rarely reported. We also examined differences between those claiming false admissions and those not. Minorities, offenders with lengthier criminal careers, and those who were more symptomatic were more likely to have self-reported false admissions than their counterparts.”

Mossman et al. on Quantifying the Accuracy of Forensic Examiners in the Absence of a “Gold Standard”

Dr. Douglas Mossman of the University of Cincinnati College of Medicine and College of Law, and colleagues, have published Quantifying the Accuracy of Forensic Examiners in the Absence of a “Gold Standard”, forthcoming in Law and Human Behavior. Here is the abstract:

“This study asked whether latent class modeling methods and multiple ratings of the same cases might permit quantification of the accuracy of forensic assessments. Five evaluators examined 156 redacted court reports concerning criminal defendants who had undergone hospitalization for evaluation or restoration of their adjudicative competence. Evaluators rated each defendant’s Dusky-defined competence to stand trial on a five-point scale as well as each defendant’s understanding of, appreciation of, and reasoning about criminal proceedings. Having multiple ratings per defendant made it possible to estimate accuracy parameters using maximum likelihood and Bayesian approaches, despite the absence of any ‘gold standard’ for the defendants’ true competence status. Evaluators appeared to be very accurate, though this finding should be viewed with caution.”

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Zarkadi et al. on Creating Fair Lineups for Suspects With Distinctive Features

Dr. Theodora Zarkadi and colleagues of the University of Warwick Department of Psychology have published Creating Fair Lineups for Suspects With Distinctive Features, forthcoming in Psychological Science. Here is the abstract:

“In their descriptions, eyewitnesses often refer to a culprit’s distinctive facial features. However, in a police lineup, selecting the only member with the described distinctive feature is unfair to the suspect and provides the police with little further information. For fair and informative lineups, the distinctive feature should be either replicated across foils or concealed on the target. In the present experiments, replication produced more correct identifications in target-present lineups-without increasing the incorrect identification of foils in target-absent lineups-than did concealment. This pattern, and only this pattern, is predicted by the hybrid-similarity model of recognition.”

HT Research Digest Blog and The Situationist.